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Abstract
In the last decade, wireless sensor networks deployed at an accelerated pace in
military, industrial, healthcare etc. ﬁelds but that were originally developed in
the late 1960s and 1970s. Navigation or localization is an intuitive important
because it can help in reducing the complexity of energy eﬃcient algorithm, target
tracking, routing protocol and data collection/aggregation algorithm in wireless
sensor networks (WSNs). Localization has an important role in both network
application domains and services; for example geographical routing. Due to self
conﬁguring nature of WSNs, it mainly deployed in a hostile environment, and hence
it can be easily threatened by internal or external attack. Therefore, localization
and security are essential issues in WSNs. We know that ’Wormhole Attack’ is a
severe security threat where two malicious colluding sensor nodes create a virtual
tunnel to WSNs. Detection and prevention of wormhole attacks in WSNs are a
considerably challenging task because of its independence of MAC protocols and
immunity to cryptology techniques. Around all the existing defenses have required
some additional hardware requirements on the network or strong assumptions; that’s
may not have perfect applicability in real environment. Our main objectives are to
ﬁnd the location of wormhole attackers as well as the location of sensor nodes in
a wireless network system. In our schemes, we consider the three types of nodes :
locators, attackers and sensors in the network and makes a conﬂicting set matrix on
the basis of abnormal behavior of message exchanging among neighboring locators,
which helps in diﬀerentiation between valid locators and dubious locators. We
evaluate location estimation results through simulations in our last section.
Keywords: Wireless Sensor Networks, Wormhole Attacks, Localization, Conﬂicting set,
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
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Introduction
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Wireless sensor network (WSN)
Wireless sensor network (WSN) is an important and accelerated area of deeply
networked systems of low battery powered wireless sensor nodes with small amount
of memory and CPU, and useful in various critical domains such as environment,
military, industry, healthcare, commercial, science/technology, security, home and
process control applications. A sensor node is a tiny light weighted device that collects
the sensory data, compute/process the data and can communicate with neighboring
nodes in the network [21]. In a large and open environment ﬁrst time, wireless
network was used in the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), to detect and track
Soviet submarines in the late 1950s by the United States Military. In 1960s and 1970s,
echoes made to develop hardware for the internet. In 1980s, United States Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) developed the distributed sensor
network (DSN). First time, Carnegie Mellon University and Massachusetts Institute
of Technology Lincoln Labs started research work on DSN. IBM and Bell Labs also
started industrial applications of WSNs in power distribution and factory automation.
Every decade, size of sensor devices becomes smaller and the involvement of people
in its control and monitoring requires very less number up to zero. In Figure 1.1, we
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can see the accelerated progress in WSNs during last ﬁve decades.
Figure 1.1: Progress of WSNs in last ﬁve decades
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are built with a very large number of tiny light
weighted and inexpensive sensor nodes that have typically resource constrained,
limited memory, with low-battery backup sensors, slow embedded processors, and
low-bandwidth radios in virtually any environment to solve problems in many ﬁelds
such as environmental monitoring systems, military ﬁeld operations and emergency
response systems [22]. Sensors are either passive or active in state. Passive sensors
are seismic, acoustic and temperature measuring devices. It consumes low energy.
Active sensors are included in radar and sonar and these consumes high energy.
General features of sensor node in WSNs are following as:
• Sensor nodes are densely deployed even in an open environment.
• Topology of sensor network changes highly frequently.
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• Sensor nodes have limited memory, battery power, and computational
capacities.
• Sensor nodes may prone to failures because low battery power.
• Sensor nodes may not have a unique identity.
Figure 1.2: Generic protocol structure of sensor networks
Usually, sensor networks are dispersed randomly in a hostile/unfriendly
environment and hence the sensor nodes are threatened by various types of
attacks. So many attacks in the networks e.g., black-hole, wormhole, Sybil attack
Denial-of-Service (DoS) and replay attacks can cause an existing route to be broken
or a new route to be prevented from being established. Wormhole attacks are hard
to detect and its prevention among these attacks because wormhole attack does not
inject abnormal volumes of traﬃc into the network [1–9].
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Upper layers For network applications and also for data aggregation,
external database and external querying query processing
Layer 4 For transport and also for data dissemination and accumulation
Layer 3 For networking and also for adaptive topology management and
topological routing
Layer 2 Data link layer: channel sharing (MAC), time SYN/ASYN.,
data compression and locality
Layer 1 Physical medium: communication channel, sensing, signal processing and
actuation
Table 1.1: WSN Protocol Stack [21]
1.2 Applications of sensor networks
Initially sensor nodes were mainly used to detect intrusion in military applications.
Now days, we can’t grow even a step without WSNs. Sensor networks have been
used in accelerated motion in every ﬁeld. Wireless sensor network applications are
following as:
• Military applications: Targeting, battleﬁeld surveillance, battle damage
assessment, monitoring inimical forces, biological, nuclear and chemical attack
detection etc.
• Environmental applications: Flood detection, forest ﬁre Detection, micro
climates, agriculture etc.
• Health applications: Tracking/monitoring patients and doctors, remote
monitoring of physiological data, drug administration etc.
• Commercial applications: Traﬃc ﬂow surveillance, vehicle tracking,
Environmental control in industries and oﬃces and detection, inventory control.
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• Home applications: Home/institute automation, automated meter reading,
instrumented environment etc.
1.3 Thesis organization
Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction and applications to wireless sensor network.
Chapter 2 explores the diﬀerent types of attacks in the wireless sensor network. It
also explores about wormhole attacks, localization and k-means. Chapter 3 it throws
light on localization approaches, wormhole attacks and basic terms by survey papers.
The proposed scheme has been discussed in Chapter 4. We described the localization
scheme on attackers as well as sensor nodes using conﬂicting set. Chapter 5 described
the simulation results and their analysis along our proposed scheme. Finally, Chapter
6 concludes our research work.
6
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Attacks and their Classiﬁcation
It is a very challenging task to secure wireless sensor networks because of its
characteristics such as unreliable wireless communication, resource constraints,
self organizing, unknown topology prior to deployment, physical tampering and
unprotected environment. To secure them, we have to satisfy security goals. Some
of the attacks have been explained below :
• Sybil attack: Sybil attack was ﬁrst proposed by J. R. Douceur. In the
Sybil attack, an adversary presents multiple identities to other nodes to the
network. Geographic routing protocols such as Greedy Perimeter Stateless
Routing (GPSR) highly susceptible to Sybil attack.
• Denial of Service (DoS) attack: DoS might send so many unnecessary
repeated requests to a server so that the server crashes because of heavy load.
The attacker may intercept or delete a server’s response or client’s request
and believed that the server is not responding. It slows down the network or
interrupt the service of a system.
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• Black hole attack: An attacker starts dropping all the network packets
through its path. If the attacker is also a sink node, the attacker is much
more eﬀective.
• Gray hole attack/Selective forwarding attack: In this attack [16],
malicious nodes behave like black hole and may refuse to forward certain
messages and simply drop them without any further propagation. An adversary
either suppressed or modiﬁed packets originating from a few selected nodes.
• Wormhole attacks: It is a severe attack in WSNs where two malicious nodes
form a virtual channel between them. Attackers pass the packet through virtual
channel and replays them into the network. It can be launched even if the
network communication uses the cryptographic technique.
2.2 Wormhole attack
Wormhole attack is a devastating attack where two malicious colluding sensor nodes
create a virtual tunnel in the wireless sensor network, which is used to forward
message packets between the tunnel edge points [1, 12]. Dezun Dong et al. [3]
analyze the inevitable symptom wormhole in the network without using any special
hardware and develop a distributed detection with some restriction. An adversary is
an outsider, who does not have a valid network identity and also not a part of the
network. The attackers have the capability to launch a variety of attacks, such as
dropping or corrupting the relayed packets, that signiﬁcantly harms a lot of network
protocols including energy eﬃcient routing, localization, and etc. The basic severe
feature of wormhole attack lies in the fact that the attackers can easily launch a
virtual wormhole without understanding the protocols or cryptographic mechanisms
used in the network.
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Figure 2.1: Pictorial view of wormhole attack in WSNs
In Figure 2.1, when the source node (S) broadcast the RREQ packet, a malicious
node (W1) which is closer to the source node (S) receives the RREQ packet. It
sniﬀs that packet to next colluding party (W2) which is near to a destination node
(D), it rebroadcasts the RREQ. The neighbors of (W2) the second colluding party
receives the RREQ and drop the further legitimate requests that may arrive later
on legitimate multihop paths. Node (D) now has two routes, the ﬁrst is ﬁve hops
long (S − A − B − C − H − D), and the second is apparently three hops long
(S −W1−W2−D). Node (D) will choose the second route since it appears to be
the shortest. Hence there may have a chance of wormhole (tunnel) in the routes of
the source (S) and the destination (D).
2.3 Localization
Localization systems are a key part of WSNs, because they not only locate events
but it is also useful in the routing protocol, density control, tracking, and a number
of other protocols. However, manual conﬁguration of individual nodes with a Global
Positioning System (GPS) receiver to obtain its location is expensive and infeasible
in large scale. GPS has also aﬀected by heavy trees and buildings because it requires
line-of-sight for communication.
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2.3.1 Localization process
A localization algorithm runs on diﬀerent input parameters. The anchor available in
the network provides the location as an input [4]. Other inputs e.g. hop counts etc.
are connectivity information for range free techniques; distance or angle between
node inputs taken from a range based techniques that calculated based on signal
modality. Generally, we take the output of the localization algorithm as an absolute
coordinate and for anchor free methods as a relative coordinate.
Figure 2.2: Process of a localization algorithm
• Signal modality: The accuracy of location estimation based on signal
modality. In this modality, we choose a suﬃcient signal type depends on the
various factors such as node hardware, the application and environment like as
in temperature, pressure, humidity, acoustic signal, etc.
• Measurement techniques: The transmitted signal from each sensor will be
processed on the receiving nodes to ﬁnd out measured transmission ranges or
hop counts. Range estimation methods measure the distance or angle between
two neighbor nodes. The famous methods of this group are Time-Of-Arrival
(TOA), Time Diﬀerence of Arrival (TDOA), Angle of Arrival (AOA), or
the Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI). Range-free algorithms are
independent of hardware and ranging error. They use only connectivity
information and hop counts between nodes as an input parameter.
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• Localization algorithms: Localization algorithm executed and produced
absolute or relative location.
• Absolute localization: The absolute location of nodes is deﬁned by
position-aware nodes (anchors).
• Relative location: Relative location can be found out by absolute localization.
We can get the relative location by ﬁnding the relationship of distance and angle
between network nodes.
2.4 k-means clustering
By Kardi Teknomo, k-means clustering is a mathematical concept by which the
objects classify into a particular class and form the cluster. It allows the unsupervised
learning of neural network, Classiﬁcation analysis, Pattern recognitions etc. It has
the following steps:
Figure 2.3: Execution ﬂow of k-means
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First of all, we have knowledge about the number of clusters of the dataset.
Initialize the centroids of each cluster randomly. Calculate the distance of each
object to the centroids and group the object based on minimum distance. Iterate
these following process until there is no any changing to its centroids.
13
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Chapter 3
Literature review
3.1 Introduction
In many WSNs applications e.g. target tracking, people monitoring, routing, forest
ﬁre detecting, vehicle tracking etc. gathered data are not usable without knowing
the location of an event. Localization problem refers to the process of estimating
and computing the positions of sensor nodes. The location service is a basic
service of many emerging computing/networking paradigms. Localization also called
positioning or navigation is a technique for determining one’s position accurately on
the surface of earth [5,17,19]. Localization is a part of the navigational problem that
provides orientation and routing information and also about its location.
In general, attackers can use high power antennas or a wired/wireless link, or
any other methods and choose the resulting route through the wormhole may have
a better metric, i.e., either have a lower hop-count or shorter distance relative to
normal routes.
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Figure 3.1: Basic approaches of wormhole attacks
3.2 Diﬀerent approaches of wormhole attacks
Wormhole attack can be achieved by primitive methods [1]. There are ﬁve basic
types of wormhole attacks.
3.2.1 Wormhole using Encapsulation
In encapsulation-based wormhole attacks, several internal nodes present between
two malicious nodes. At one wormhole edge point the data packets are encapsulated
and packets forward via wormhole link. Since encapsulated data packets do not
increase the actual hop count during the traversal through wormhole link [1]. At the
other wormhole edge point, the data packets are decapsulated and broadcast to its
neighbors.
In Figure 3.2, source nodes (S) and sink (D) try to determine the shortest path
between themselves, when the network threatened by two malicious nodes M1 and
M2. When the source node S broadcasts a RREQ, M1 gets the RREQ and
encapsulates the data packet forward toM2 through the wormhole link exists between
M1 and M2 (E-F-G). Node M2 decapsulates the data packet, and rebroadcasts it
again. Due to the encapsulation, the hop count does not increase during the traversal
through M1 and M . At the same time, a copy of the RREQ travels from S to sink
D over the path that includes nodes (A − B − C). Now, there are two routes from
16
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S to Sink: the ﬁrst one is four hops long (S − A − B − C − Sink), and the second
one appears to be three hops long (S −M1 −M2 − Sink), while in reality it is six
hops long (M1−E −F −G−M2−Sink). The sink chooses the second route since
it appears to be the shortest path. Its a possible solution is, sensor nodes choose the
fastest route reply rather than the one which claims to have the smallest number of
hop counts.
Figure 3.2: Wormhole attack using packet encapsulation
3.2.2 Wormhole Using High-quality/Out-of-band Channel
In this type, the wormhole attack is launched by having a high-quality, single-hop,
out-of-band link between the malicious nodes. This type of attack needs specialized
hardware capability.
From Figure 3.3, malicious nodes M1 and M2 linked by out-of-band channel
between themselves. Let us assume that source node (S) forward a RREQ to sink
node and sink node gets two RREQs: (S−M1−M2−Sink) and (S−A−B−C −
Sink); the ﬁrst route is shorter as well as faster than the second one and hence the
sink node chooses the traversal.
3.2.3 Wormhole Using High-power Transmission Capability
In this type of attack, there is only one malicious node with high-power transmission
capability in the network. It can communicate with other normal nodes from a long
distance. When a malicious node receives a RREQ, it broadcasts the request at a
17
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Figure 3.3: Wormhole attack using out-of-band channel
high-power level. Any node that receives the high-power broadcast rebroadcasts the
RREQ to its neighbors. It can be mitigated if each sensor node is accurately measure
the received signal strength.
3.2.4 Wormhole Using Packet Relay
In this type of attack, a malicious node relays data packets of two distant sensor
nodes to convince them that they are neighbors. In Figure 3.4(a), sensor node A and
B are actually non-neighboring nodes. Node M1 can relay packets between sensor
nodes A and B to make them believe that they are neighbors to each other. As shown
in Figure 3.4(b), if there are several cooperating malicious sensor nodes, sensor nodes
that are multiple hops away from each other can be victims of this attack.
Figure 3.4: Wormhole attack using Packet Relay
3.2.5 Wormhole Using Protocol Distortion
Routing protocols that are based on the ‘shortest delay’ instead of the ‘smallest
hop count is at the risk of wormhole attacks by using protocol distortion. In
18
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hop-count-based routing protocols, sensor nodes typically wait for a random back-oﬀ
time before RREQ forwarding to reduce the number of MAC-layer collisions. In
this wormhole mode, a malicious node can create a wormhole by not forwarding
RREQs without back-oﬀ. The purpose is to let the RREQ packet arrive ﬁrst at the
destination so that the malicious node make a part of path to the destination.
3.3 Localization
Localization systems are a key part of WSNs, because they not only locate events but
it is also useful in the routing protocol, density control, tracking, and a number of
other protocols. Localization is an active area of research with several surveys [17,19].
Minsu Huang et al. [9] apply the greedy algorithm to localize all the nodes in the
network using minimum number of anchors. J. Aspnes et al. [5] provided a network
localization solution by constructing grounded graphs to model network localization
using graph rigidity theory to test the conditions for unique localizability and to
construct uniquely localizable networks. Samira Afzal [8] surveys the localization
algorithms and proposes a diﬀerent taxonomy schemes based on key features like
learning, anchor existence, movement in network etc. Ting Zhang et al. [17] divided
localization systems into three diﬀerent components: distance/angle estimation,
position computation and localization algorithm.
• Distance/angle estimation: This component is responsible for estimating
information regarding the distances and/or angles between two nodes. This
component include receiving signal strength indicator (RSSI), time [diﬀerence]
of arrival (ToA/TDoA), number of hops, or angle of arrival (AoA).
• Position computation: This component is responsible for computing the
position of a node by getting information about the distances/angles and
positions of reference nodes. Some techniques used to compute a position
include trilateration, multilateration, or triangulation.
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• Localization algorithm: This is the main component of a localization system.
It determines how the available information will be manipulated to enable most
or all of the nodes of the WSN to estimate their positions. It is a distributed
and usually multi-hop algorithm. Some known algorithms include the Ad Hoc
Positioning System (APS) and Directed Position Estimation (DPE).
Recently, novel schemes have been proposed to determine the locations of the nodes
in a network where only some special nodes (called beacons) know their locations.
In these schemes, network nodes measure the distances to their neighbors and then
try to determine their locations. The process of computing the location of the nodes
is called network localization. For example, Savvides et al. propose the iterative
multilateration scheme to determine the location of nodes that do not know their
locations initially. Basically we have two types of nodes: regular nodes and beacons.
Regular nodes, also known as unknown, free, or dumb nodes, refer to nodes in
the network that have no knowledge of their position and no special hardware to
acquire this information. Beacon nodes or locators, are nodes that do not require a
localization system to estimate their physical positions.
A localization algorithm localizes sensor nodes based on diﬀerent input parameters.
The anchor available in the network provides the location as an input [4]. Other
inputs e.g. hop counts etc. are connectivity information for range free techniques;
distance or angle between node inputs taken from a range based techniques that
calculated based on signal modality. Generally, we take the output of the localization
algorithm as an absolute coordinate and for anchor free methods as a relative
coordinate.
20
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3.4 Reviewed papers
Majid Meghdadi et al. 2011 [1], Priya Maidamwar et al. 2012 [12], Murad
A. Rassam et al. 2012 [16] described the fundamental types of wormhole
attacks and also gave its solution. They discussed wormhole attack detection
mechanisms: Distance-bounding/Consistency-based Approaches, Synchronized
Clock-based Solutions, Multidimensional Scaling-Visualization-based Solutions,
Trust-based Solutions, Localization-based Solutions, Secure Neighbor Discovery
Approaches, Connectivity-based Approaches, Radio Fingerprinting Approaches.
Jin Guo et al. 2011 [2] found the characteristics of wormhole attacks and applied
wormhole attack defense strategy based on neighbors veriﬁcation. In this strategy,
each normal node received the control packet and monitor the control packet to
decide that whether the control packet coming from normal nodes or not to avoid
the wormhole attacks. The lacking part of their paper, initially all normal nodes
deployed static in the network and determined their neighbors but, they considered,
there were no any malicious node at that time.
Dezun Dong et al. 2011 [3] analyzed symptom of wormholes and developed
distributed detection methods by making few assumptions. They gave eﬀective
distributed detection approach which fully depends on network connectivity
information, against wormhole attacks by topological methods without using any
extra hardware devices. By detecting non separating loops (pairs), their approach can
detect and locate various wormholes and relies solely on the topological information
of the network.
Azzedine Boukerche et al. 2008 [4], Ting Zhang et al. 2012 [17], Samira Afzal,
2012 [18], A. Srinivasan et al. 2008 [19] and Amitangshu Pal et al. 2010 [22]
deﬁne the secure localization schemes in WSNs. They explain the security through
cryptography and also non-cryptography in localization. They explain approaches of
Liu et al. In their method, the sensor ﬁeld is quantized into a grid of cells, and each
neighboring reference node votes on the cells. Finally, they determine the centroid
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of voted cells and set it to the position of the node. Since they used centroid to ﬁnd
out node location but it gives more accurate if the reference nodes deployed densely
in the network.
J. Aspnes et al. 2004 [5] provide the localization scheme by some anchor
nodes. They construct grounded graphs by connecting the neighbor nodes and
apply graph rigidity theory to test the conditions for unique localizability and to
construct uniquely localizable networks. They used trilateration method for distance
measurement in localization. Mingbo Zhao et al. 2005 [6] gave a maximum likelihood
estimation method. MLE method used in ﬁnding localization via triangulation,
trilateration, and also in Gaussian noise.
Junfeng Wu et al. 2010 [7] proposed a label-based secure localization scheme to
defend against the wormhole attack. This approach is a range-free algorithm and
anchors in the network ﬁnd hop-counts. In this scheme, they generate a pseudo
neighbor list for each beacon node, use all pseudo neighbor lists received from
neighboring beacon nodes to classify all attacked nodes into diﬀerent groups, and
then label all neighboring nodes. According to the labels of neighboring nodes, each
node prohibits the communications with its pseudo neighbors, which are attacked by
the wormhole attack. But it works well when the network has no packet loss, and
the transmission ranges of all nodes are identical.
Xiaomeng Ban et al. 2011 [8] introduce a wormhole detection algorithm based
on local connectivity tests. In this approach, there were two sets of neighbors on
both sides of wormhole link. Small neighbors of opposite ends of wormhole link are
removed one by one, we got a time where the network is free from the wormhole.
Minsu Huang et al. 2010 [9] apply the greedy algorithm using both trilateration
and local sweep operations to localize all the nodes in the network using minimum
number of anchors. MCLP determines the minimum anchor set to localize the whole
network.
TIAN Bin et at. 2012 [10] proposed a scheme based on statistical analysis. In
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this scheme, a sensor can detect the fake neighbors by neighbor discovery process,
and then apply a k-means clustering method to determine its true neighbors and fake
neighbors.
Zorana Bankovic et al. 2012 [11] propose a machine learning solution to detect
temporal and spatial inconsistencies in the sequences of sensed values and the routing
paths. In the presence of an attacker, produced data considered as outliers and
applied clustering techniques for anomaly detection.
H. Chen et al. 2010 [13–15] proposed a localization scheme based on conﬂicting
set. In their scheme, there are three diﬀerent types of nodes: sensor, locator
and attacker. Localization is mainly depending on conﬂicting set matrix. They
consider two classes: Class 1 and Class 2 wormhole attacks. In the ﬁrst stage, they
apply wormhole detect approach in the network. In the second stage, they apply
neighboring locators diﬀerentiation schemes and in third stage apply the secure
localization process using the MLE method. The scheme applies the localization
process only for sensor. It is beneﬁcial when the length of wormhole link is less than
2 ∗RL otherwise, it is common to other approaches.
Loukas Lazos et al .2004 [20] proposed a range independent localization algorithm
in an untrusted environment. In SeRLoc, each locator transmits diﬀerent beacons
at each antenna sector with each beacon containing, (a) the locator’s co-ordinates,
(b) the angles of the antenna boundary lines, with respect to a common global axis.
The sensor can identify the region within which they reside by computing the overlap
between all the sectors that they hear. Each sensor determines its location as the
center of gravity (CoG) of the overlapping region.
Kazem Sohraby et al. 2010 [21] discussed all about the wireless sensor network.
They explain WSNs and its application, wireless transmission technology, MAC
protocol, routing and TCP protocol in WSNs, network management, performance
etc.
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3.5 Motivation
Localization is a part of navigation problem to ﬁnd out one’s position accurately on
the surface of the earth. The motivation came from the growing need for localization
in WSNs because the core function of WSNs collects and processed the sensory
data and to detect and report events only if the accurate location of the event is
known [19]. The three important metrics associated with localization are energy
eﬃciency, accuracy, and security. Though the ﬁrst two metrics have been researched
extensively, the last i.e. the security metric has drawn the attention of researchers
only recently, and as such has not been addressed adequately. The objective of this
research work is to ﬁnd out location information of any sensor node at low cost in
the wireless sensor networks even when it is threatened by wormhole attack.
3.6 Problem deﬁnition
WSNs are widely deployed in hostile environments and hence it can be easily
threatened by so many attacks as, black hole attack, wormhole attacks, gray hole
attack etc. WSNs are widely spread in the network, so we can’t aﬃx the GPS
receiver in each and every sensor node because GPS receivers are costly and also
sensor has constraint energy and memory space. Wormhole attack is a severe threat
and is immune to MAC protocol and cryptology. So, wormhole attack can easily
launch a virtual link and aﬀect the localization scheme in WSNs. Localization is
itself information in so many applications. Most authors provided the solutions
based on anchors to resolve the localization problem. We are also using anchors to
the resolving localization problem but we use conﬂicting set concept in localization
without using any external device.
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Chapter 4
Proposed scheme
4.1 Introduction
We considered that the three diﬀerent types of nodes: locators, sensors and
attackers dispersed in the network. Locators are uniformly distributed and have
known location and its identiﬁcation. Sensors are randomly distributed in the
network and they estimate their locations by neighboring locators via message
exchanges. The attackers launch a wormhole in the network. For simpliﬁcation,
we assume that the transmission range of sensors, locators and attackers are RS, RL
and RA respectively and have their relations RS ≤ RL ≤ RA. DRS (S) represents
disc centered at S with radius RS.
Types of sensor nodes:
• Neighboring locators (N − locators)/LN : Those locators that can
communicate with the sensor, either via the wormhole link or not, are deﬁned
as the (N-locators) of the sensor.
• Valid locator (V − locators)/LV : The neighboring locators, which can
communicate directly with the sensor, are called (V-locators).
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Figure 4.1: (a) Class 1 wormhole attacks, (b) Class 2 wormhole attacks
• Dubious locator (D − locators)/LD: The locators, that can communicate
with the sensor via the wormhole link, are deﬁned as (D-locators).
In Figure 4.1(a),
Neighboring locators : LN={L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L6, L7, L8, L10, L14}
Valid locators : LV={L3, L4, L6, L7, L8, L10, L14}
Dubious locators : LD={L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L7, L8, L14}
In Figure 4.1(b),
Neighboring locators : LN = {L2, L3, L4, L5, L6, L7, L8, L14}
Valid locators : LV = {L2, L3, L4, L6, L10, L11}
Dubious locators : LD = {L4, L5, L7, L8, L14}
4.1.1 Wormhole Attack Classiﬁcation
When the sensor node communicates with the locators via wormhole link then two
types of wormhole classiﬁcation may arise.
• Class 1 wormhole attack: The sensor is considered under Class 1 wormhole
attack, when the sensor receives the same message transmitted by itself via the
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wormhole link. Therefore the measured distance between the sensor and one of
the attackers is less than RS, while measuring the distance between the sensor
and the other attacker is less than RA.
• Class 2 Wormhole attacks: The sensor is considered under class 2 wormhole
attack, when the sensor can exchange messages in the network via the wormhole
link, but can’t receive its own message. Therefore, the measured distance
between the sensor and one of the attackers is less than RS, while the measured
distance between the sensor and the other attacker is larger than RA.
4.1.2 Wormhole attack detection
The following four properties can be used to detect the existence of the wormhole
attack [13, 14]:
(A) Node’s self-exclusion property: A node can’t receive a message/messages
transmitted by itself in a loop-free path.
(B) Packet unduplication property: A node can receive at most one copy of
the same message from one of its neighboring nodes.
(C) Neighboring nodes’ spatial constraint property: A node can’t receive
messages from its two neighboring nodes simultaneously if the measured
distance between them is larger than 2*RS.
(D) Node’s spatial constraint property: The measured distance between two
neighboring nodes can’t be larger than the transmission range (RL or RS).
Now, if it violates any of the above sensor properties then it is threatened by
wormhole attack, there we apply Neighboring Locators Diﬀerentiation Scheme to
ﬁnd the actual neighbors of the node.
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4.2 Conﬂicting Set
Neighboring locators (Li) can be determined if every locator builds the conﬂict sets.
Those locators that are not involved in the conﬂicting sets but its beacon message
received by the sensor node, such locators are considered as valid locator (LV ).
Conﬂicting sets (C (Li)) create a list of the abnormality of the beacon message
exchange among neighboring locators.
Conﬂicting Set Theorem [13]:
• If Li lies in DRA (A2) but not in DRA(A1), all the locators in C (Li) lie in DRL (A1)
• If Li lies in DRA (A1) but not in DRA (A2) all the locators in C (Li) lie in DRL (A2)
• If Li lies in DRA (A1) ∩ DRA (A2) , all the locators in C (Li) lie in DRL (A1) ∪ DRL (A2).
From Figure 4.1, Conﬂict sets of Li:
C(L1/ L2/ L3/ L13)={L4, L5, L7, L8, L14}
C(L4/ L5/ L9/ L14)={L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L7, L8, L14}
C(L6)={L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L14}
C(L7/ L8)={L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L14}
Here we can see that, the locators (L4, L5, L14) lie in DRL(A1)∩DRL(A2) and also,
lie in the C (L4, L5, L14). As locators (L6, L13) do not lie in the conﬂicting sets C
(Li) hence locators (L6, L13) are taken as valid locators if they are in the range of
DRS(S) otherwise they are not taken.
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Every locator makes a conﬂicting set matrix (LC) of those locators that ﬁnd the
abnormal behavior of locators.
LC =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
L11 L12 L13 ... L1n
L21 L22 L23 ... L2n
: : : ... :
Ln1 Ln2 Ln3 ... Lnn
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Here,
Lij =
⎧⎨
⎩
0, when Li is not in the list of C(Li) i.e.; Lj /∈ C(Li)
1, when Lj ∈ C(Li)
For making the conﬂicting set C (Li), locator Li can use either distance formula
or time of arrival (ToA).
Algorithm 1 Conﬂicting Set Matrix
1: for every receiving beacon message as Li and Lj do
2: if ((x2i − x2j ) + (y2i − y2j )) > R2L then
3: LC [i][j] ← 1;
4: else if (a locator violates the Node’s self-exclusion property) then
5: LC [i][j] ← 1, ∀ pairs of locator who receive the loc− ACK message;
6: else if distance using TOA >RL then
7: LC [i][j] ← 1;
8: else
9: LC [i][j] ← 0;
10: end if
11: end for
The Algorithm 1, helps to decide which locator counted as a dubious or not.
Every locator broadcasts a hello message in the network. If a locator receives a hello
message from outside of its transmission range, then the other end of locator counted
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as dubious/conﬂicted locator for that locator and it can be added into the conﬂicted
set matrix. The same process is repeated for all locators.
4.3 Localization on Attackers
In our scheme, we have taken two cases. In ﬁrst case we have taken simple form by
taking only two attackers and in second case we have generalized it into N-number
of wormhole attackers in the network.
A. Wormhole with two attackers in the network
From the conﬂicting list we see that for the locator Li ∈ DRL (A2) but Li /∈ C(Li)
then all locators of C (Li) lie in the DRL (A1). Similarly, if Li ∈ DRA (A1) then all
the locators in C (Li) lie in the DRL (A2). Also for the locator Li ∈ C(Li) i.e. Li ∈
DRL (A1) ∩ DRL (A2); C (Li) shows all the locators within DRL (A1) ∪ DRL (A2)
region.
From Algorithm 2, we get two sets of conﬂicting set (CS1andCS2) and their
corresponding number of conﬂicted nodes i.e., count1 and count2. With the help of
conﬂicting set we can ﬁnd the position of both attackers A1 and A2 using centroid
method.
Location of attacker A1(XA1, YA1),
XA1 =
ΣxLi∈CS1
count1
=
xL1 + xL2 + xL3 + xL4 + xL5 + xL14
6
=
∑
xC(Li∈(DRL (A2)−DRL (A1)))∑
count(C(Li))
(4.1)
YA1 =
ΣyLi∈CS1
count1
=
yL1 + yL2 + yL3 + yL4 + yL5 + yL14
6
=
∑
yC(Li∈(DRL (A2)−DRL (A1))∑
count(C(Li))
(4.2)
Similarly, location of attacker A2(XA2, YA2),
XA2 =
ΣxLi∈CS2
count2
=
xL4 + xL5 + xL7 + xL8 + xL14
5
=
∑
xC(Li∈(DRL(A1)−DRL (A2)))∑
count(C(Li))
(4.3)
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Algorithm 2 Wormhole with two attackers
1: count1=count2 ← 0; vector <int> CS1=CS2 ← φ; //CSi ← new vector conﬂicting set of i-type
2: for i do=1.. N // N= number of locators; C (Li) = conﬂicting lists of Li
3: if ((C(Li) 	= φ) && (Li /∈ C(Li)) && (Li /∈ CS1)) then
4: if C (Li) ∈ CS2 then
5: CS1.push back(Li);
6: count1 +← 1;
7: end if
8: if CS2 == φ then
9: CS2.push back(C(Li));
10: CS1.push back(Li);
11: count1 +← 1;
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: CS2 ← φ;
16: for i do=1..N
17: if LC [I] [I] ==1 then // Li ∈ C (Li) then
18: CS1. push back (Li);
19: CS2. push back (Li);
20: count1 +← 1;
21: count2 +← 1;
22: end if
23: end for
24: for i do=1.. N
25: if (C(Li) 	= φ) && (Li /∈ C(Li)) && (Li /∈ CS2) then
26: if C (Li) ∈ CS1 then
27: CS2.push back(Li);
28: count2 +← 1;
29: end if
30: end if
31: end for
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YA2 =
ΣyLi∈CS2
count2
=
yL4 + yL5 + yL7 + yL8 + yL14
5
=
∑
yC(Li∈(DRL(A1)−DRL (A2)))∑
count(C(Li))
(4.4)
B. Wormhole with N-attackers in the network
Using this conﬂicting set matrix (LC), we can ﬁnd numbers of wormhole attackers in
the network.
Algorithm 3 Wormhole with N-attackers
1: Initialize counter←0; vector <int> CS←null; //CS ← new vector conﬂicting set
2: for i do=1..N // N= number of locators; C(Li) = conﬂicting list of Li
3: if thenLC [I] [I] ==1 then // Li ∈ C (Li)
4: CS. push back (C (Li));
5: counter +← 2;
6: end if
7: end for
8: for i do=1.. N
9: if ( then(C(Li) 	= φ) && (Li /∈ C(Li)) && C(Li) /∈ CS) then
10: counter +← 1;
11: CS. push back (C (Li))
12: end if
13: end for
In Algorithm 3, counter gives the number of attackers which form the wormhole
and a set of conﬂicted set of locators in the network. We can apply k-means (k =
counter) property on the conﬂicted set (CS) of locators. Finally, we get the estimated
position of locators by k-means property.
4.4 Localization on sensor
We have taken two classes of sensor position in the network. First one, when it
is under Class 1 wormhole attacks and the second one, when it is under Class 2
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wormhole attacks. The Identiﬁcation scheme Ii,j represents Identiﬁcation scheme of
Class ith wormhole attack with jth scheme.
A. Class 1 wormhole attack identiﬁcation scheme
When the sensor node shows Node’s self-exclusion property then the sensor node
consider under Class 1 wormhole attack. To identify the V-locators the following
identiﬁcation schemes are,
1. Identiﬁcation scheme I1,1: When the sensor is under Class 1 wormhole attack
and the sensor node receives three loc − ACK messages for a locator Li and
its conﬂicting set C (Li) 	= Φ and Li ∈ C (Li) then that locator Li considered
as V-locator as well as D-locators. From ﬁg 4.1(a) the sensor node (S) receives
three times loc − ACK messages of same locator L14. Hence, L14 considered
as V-locator as well as a D-locator.
2. Identiﬁcation scheme I1,2: When the sensor is under Class 1 wormhole attack
and the sensor node receives only one loc−ACK message for a locator Li where
C(Li) 	= φ and Li /∈ (DRL(A1) ∪ DRL(A2)) then that locator Li considered as
a V-locator e.g., (L6). If C (Li) 	= φ and Li ∈ (DRL(A1) ∪ DRL(A2)) then that
locator Li is considered as a D-locator e.g., (L1, L2, L7, L8).
3. Identiﬁcation scheme I1,3: When the sensor is under Class 1 wormhole attack
and the sensor node receives two loc − ACK messages for a locator Li but at
least one of the route distance is in the range of sensor node then that locator
Li considered as a V-locator as well as a D-locator e.g., (L3, L4) otherwise, it
is considered as D-locator e.g, (L5).
The above identiﬁcation schemes help to ﬁnd out the diﬀerentiation between valid
and dubious locators. We collect the valid locators and apply the maximum likelihood
estimation method to ﬁnd out its location.
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B. Class 2 wormhole attack identiﬁcation scheme
From Figure 4.1(b), when the sensor is under Class 2 wormhole attack, only those
locators in DRL(A2) are D-locators. The following identiﬁcation schemes work in this
case:
1. Identiﬁcation scheme I2,1 [13]: Similar to I1,3, when the sensor is under
Class 2 wormhole attacks, those locators, which violate packet unduplication
property are considered as V-locators as well as D-locators where its distance
corresponding to response time ≤ RS e.g., L4.
2. Identiﬁcation scheme I2,2 [13]: When the sensor is under a Class 2 wormhole
attack and, the distance between two neighboring locators of the sensor which
is larger than 2*RL, one of the two locators having greater response time is
a D-locator while the other is a V-locator. From Figure 4.1(b), the distance
between L2 and L8 is larger than 2RL. Therefore, the sensor determines that
the shortest response time locator treated as V-locator(e.g., L2) and the other
is treated as a D-locator (L8).
3. Identiﬁcation scheme I2,3 [13]: The valid locators Li (from I2,2) such that C
(Li) 	= φ and Li /∈ C (Li), then ∀Lj ∈ C(Li) are Lj ∈ LD. From Figure 4.1(b),
here L2 is a valid locator and C(L2)={L4, L5, L7, L8, L14} and L2 /∈C(L2), hence
all elements of C (L2) are counted as D-locators (LD).
4. Identiﬁcation scheme I2,4: The dubious locators Li (from I2,2, I2,3) such
that Li /∈ C(Li) and C(Li) 	= φ, then ∀Lj ∈ C(Li) are considered as valid
locators (i.e. Lj ∈ LV ) so as to the sensor node receives a loc−ACK message
for locator Lj . From Figure 4.1(b), for a dubious locator L8, conﬂicting set
C(L8)={L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L14} where L8 /∈ C(L8) and hence the locators Lj
in C (L8) are considered as valid locators so as to the sensor node receives a
loc− ACK message for that locators e.g., {L2, L3} ∈ LV .
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5. Identiﬁcation scheme I2,5: Similar to I1,2, when the sensor node receives only
one loc − ACK message for a locator Li where C(Li) 	= φ and Li /∈ (DRL(A1)
∪ DRL(A2)) then that locator Li considered as a V-locator e.g.,(L6).
Identiﬁcation scheme I3: when the sensor node receives only one loc − ACK
message for a locator Li and its C(Li) = φ then such locators are considered as
V-locators.
From the above all classiﬁcation schemes as I1,∗, I2,∗ and I3; we separate the LV
and LD. We are considering those locators Li ∈ LV and also those locators that have
no any conﬂicting list (from I3), the locators also considered as LV ; with the help
V-locators we can ﬁnd the location of the sensor.
Using wormhole attack detection and neighboring locators diﬀerentiation processes,
the sensor can identify the valid locator. Now we can apply Maximum Likelihood
Estimation (MLE) method for localization.
C. Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) localization
Let the sensor node got valid distance measurements from m locators. The
co-ordinates of the m valid locators are as {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y3), ..., (xm, ym)} and
its corresponding distance measurements by RSSI/TOA/TDOA method from the m
locators to the sensor are {d1, d2, d3, ..., dm}. Let the location of the sensor is S(x, y).
Therefore, from distance formula,
(x1 − x)2 + (y1 − y)2 = d21
(x2 − x)2 + (y2 − y)2 = d22
(x3 − x)2 + (y3 − y)2 = d23
: ... : ... :
(xm − x)2 + (ym − y)2 = d2m
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(5)
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Algorithm 4 Neighboring locators scheme
1: Each locator periodically exchanges beacon messages among its neighboring
locators and builds its conﬂicting set based on the received beacon messages.
2: Each locator replies loc − ACK message including its conﬂicting set when it
receives loc− REQ from the sensor node.
3: if the sensor node violates the properties {(A),(B),(C) or (D)} then
4: the sensor node is under wormhole attack
5: if sensor node violates property (A) then
6: the sensor is under Class 1 and applies identiﬁcation schemes I1,1, I1,2 and
I1,3.
7: else
8: the sensor is under Class 2 and applies identiﬁcation schemes I2,1, I2,2,
I2,3, I2,4, I2,5
9: end if
10: end if
11: The sensor node scan the identiﬁcation scheme I3.
12: for every locator Li, separates LV and LD.
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In equation (5), subtracts the last expression from above every expression.
x21−x2m+y21−y2m−d21+d2m = [2x(x1−xm) + 2y(y1−ym)]
x22−x2m+y22−y2m−d22+d2m = [2x(x2−xm) + 2y(y2−ym)]
x23−x2m+y23−y2m−d23+d2m = [2x(x3−xm) + 2y(y3−ym)]
:
The above equation can be represented as a linear equation MP = N . Where,
M =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2(x1 − xm) 2(y1 − ym)
2(x2 − xm) 2(y2 − ym)
2(x3 − xm) 2(y3 − ym)
: :
2(xm−1 − xm) 2(ym−1 − ym)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
N =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x21−x2m+y21−y2m−d21+d2m
x22−x2m+y22−y2m−d22+d2m
x23−x2m+y23−y2m−d23+d2m
.....
x2m−1−x2m+y2m−1−y2m−d2m−1+d2m
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
P =
⎡
⎣ x
y
⎤
⎦
This can be calculated as -
P = (MTM)−1MTN (6)
Finally, we get the location of the sensor node S(x, y) from the equation (6).
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4.4.1 Analytical study of proposed scheme
In our proposed scheme, we assume that all types of sensors are static in nature.
Each locator broadcasts beacon messages and makes a conﬂicting set matrix (LC)
and it can be achieve by Algorithm 1. Algorithm 2 separates two sets of conﬂicted
locators, so we can apply centroid formula for ﬁnding the location of attackers when
the network is threatened by only two attackers. When the network threatened by
more than two attackers simultaneously then use Algorithm 3 to ﬁnd out the number
of attackers in the whole networks. After we apply k-means clustering method to
ﬁnd out locations of attackers.
In second stage, we apply sensor identiﬁcation schemes I1,1, I1,2, I1,3 for Class 1
wormhole attacks and I2,1, I2,2, I2,3, I2,4, I2,5 and I3 for Class 2 wormhole attacks.
With the help these schemes we separate the valid locators against dubious locators
and apply the MLE method to ﬁnd out the sensor location.
Correctness
An algorithm is correct for a problem if it is correct for all instances of the problem. In
our research, locators are uniformly distributed in the wireless sensor networks. Each
locators sends the beacon messages to the neighbors and builds a conﬂict set matrix
(LC). The matrix helps us to decide the attacker’s position. Since the conﬂicting
sets of locators uniformly distributed around the attackers in a circular region, we
can also say that the attackers are in the central position of the conﬂicted locators
and hence attackers are the centroid of the conﬂicted locators. Equations (1), (2),
(3) and (4) are the coordinate locations of the attackers.
On the other hand, we need at least three valid locators to ﬁnd out the co-ordinate
position of the sensor node in a randomly distributed network and apply equally
(6) and the neighboring locators scheme algorithm. Let the coordinates of the N
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valid locators are as {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y3), ..., (xN , yN)} and the corresponding
measured distance from the sensor node to m locators are {d1, d2, d3, ..., dN}. Let the
location of the sensor is S(x, y).
The root mean square (RMS) error of the sensor location estimation is,
δ2 =
∑N
i=1 [di −
√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2]2/N
Completeness
An algorithm is complete for a problem if it completes all parts of the problem. In
our proposed, we consider three types of sensor nodes: locators, sensors and attackers
in the wireless sensor networks. We know that locators are already position-aware
nodes (anchors). Using Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 we determine
the location of attackers. For sensor node localization, we apply sensor identiﬁcation
schemes I1,1, I1,2, I1,3 for Class 1 wormhole attacks and I2,1, I2,2, I2,3, I2,4, I2,5 and I3
for Class 2 wormhole attacks and apply MLE method. So, in our proposed scheme
we got the position of all types of sensor nodes in network.
Message Transmission
Each locator broadcasts the beacon messages to the neighbors and builds a conﬂict
set matrix (LC). Therefore, to ﬁnd out the attacker’s position there are N*(N-1)
beacon messages transmitted along the network. Once the conﬂicting sets matrix
LC created, to ﬁnd out the sensor node location, sensor node broadcasts loc−REQ
message to its neighboring locators. In this scheme, total messages transferred in the
network to ﬁnd out the attacker and sensor node’s position are (N*(N-1) + n).
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Complexity
Communication cost
In the network each locators broadcasts the beacon messages to each other. Let
N be the number of locators in the network. Since each locators broadcasts the
beacon messages to each other, therefore at most NC2 communication among locators.
Therefore, communication cost is O(N2).
Space complexity
Let N be the number of locators. From Algorithm 1, we got the conﬂicting set matrix
(LC). Since matrix LC has a dimension of NxN. So its space complexity is O(N
2).
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Chapter 5
Simulation and results
There are three diﬀerent types of sensor nodes : sensors, locators and attackers in
the network. The transmission ranges of sensor, locator and attacker are RS =
27m, RL = 28.3m and RA = 30m respectively with −5dBm transmission output
sensitivity. We deployed 39 sensor nodes in the network of 100x100 m2 area. We
deployed only N = 36 locators in grid view structure in the network. Rest two
attackers and one sensor node deployed random in nature in the network. So, for
the energy points of view this approach is more eﬃcient than others because the
scheme requires only 4 − 5% locators to ﬁnd the location of the sensor node and
the attackers. Let the length of the wormhole link is (LW12). It gives more accurate
results for localization and it is the most helpful when
LW12
RA
≤ 2, but for LW12
RA
> 2, it
is common to other approaches.
In Table 5.1, we gave network simulation environment and in Figure 5.1, we
depicted the pictorial view of network structure having 36 locators which arranged
in grid structure view; two attackers (nodeID: 36, 37) deployed randomly; one out of
1000 sensors (nodeID: 38) also deployed random.
We get the table of conﬂicted set matrix (LC) when the network threatened by A1
(32, 34) and A2 (62, 64) from Figure 5.2.
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Simulation time 150s
Deployment of network 100x100 m2
Deployment of locators 6x6 grid structure
Deployment of attackers and sensors random
Transmission output sensitivity -5dBm
Initial energy 18720 J
Number of sensors 39
Table 5.1: Simulation parameters in Castalia 3.2
Figure 5.1: Nodes’ deployment in grid view structure in the WSNs
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In the LC table,
LC [i][j] =
⎧⎨
⎩
1, nodeID (j) conﬂictedwith nodeID (i) where i, j = 0..36
0, no any conﬂiction
Now, we can ﬁnd out the position of attackers using Algorithm 2: wormhole with
two attackers’ position and equations (1), (2), (3), (4).
In Figure 5.3, we can see the position diﬀerence of the attacker from its actual
position. On an average, we got a relation between actual and estimated position of
the attacker to our network deployment. From Figure 5.4,
estimated position of the attacker = actual position of the attacker ±
3.2367 m (approx.)
In Figure 5.5, we can see the position diﬀerence of the attacker from its actual
position. On an average, we got a relation between actual and estimated position of
the sensor to our network deployment. From Figure 5.6,
estimated position of the sensor = actual position of sensor ± 0.2199 m
(approx.)
In Figure 5.7, we compare our result to SLAW [13] to ﬁnd out the probability of
wormhole attacks using TOA method. Our result is comparatively beneﬁcial when
the length of the wormhole link ≤ 2 otherwise it is common to SLAW approach.
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Figure 5.2: Tabular form of LC (36 x 36) when A1 (32,34) and A2 (62,64) in the
network
46
Simulation and results
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Attacker − x − position (in meter)
At
ta
ck
er
 −
 y
 −
 p
os
itio
n 
(in
 m
ete
r)
 
 
Actual position
Estimated position
Figure 5.3: Comparisons of actual and estimated position of attackers
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Figure 5.4: Radial error in attacker from its actual position
47
Simulation and results
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Sensor x − position (in meter)
Se
ns
or
 y
 −
 p
os
itio
n 
(in
 m
ete
r)
 
 
Actual position
Estimated position
Figure 5.5: Comparisons of actual and estimated position of sensors
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Figure 5.6: Radial error in sensor from its actual position
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Conclusions and future work
The proposed scheme is a secure and eﬃcient localization technique against wormhole
attack in wireless sensor networks. We know that localization is itself an information
and it helps in the routing protocol, target tracking etc. Here we applied the
conﬂicting set localization scheme and get the proper position of the sensor node and
also, the attacker’s position in the references of locators. In this paper, the attacker
localization scheme is applicable for any number of attackers in the network. Once we
get the location of the attackers we can take a decision to disable/destroy/control the
attacker in the network so that it can’t harm or misguide the network. Our scheme
gives the secure equations in two dimensions networks but, it is also applicable in
three dimensional spaces. We consider, all types of nodes in the network are static in
nature. If we assume, the nodes in the network are stable during the localization then
this scheme is also applicable for the dynamic nature of nodes. A challenging task to
apply the localization when the network is attacked by more than two attackers
simultaneously. For this problem, we apply the attacker localization scheme to
resolve the attackers and then apply neighboring locators diﬀerentiation process. The
other solution, we can apply wormhole attack detection process and apply separate
localization process one by one.
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